Income Taxation and The Mobility of Capital: A Global Perspective
Abstract
Income taxation and capital mobility are fundamental components of the global economy. The rapid advancement of technology and increasing financial integration have led to enhanced capital flows across borders, presenting significant challenges to national tax systems. As multinational corporations (MNCs) and wealthy individuals gain the ability to move capital to jurisdictions with lower tax rates, a competitive environment emerges, often resulting in reduced tax revenues for higher-tax countries. This dynamic leads to what is known as “tax competition,” where countries lower their tax rates in an effort to attract investment, which can sometimes undermine the tax base. This paper examines the relationship between income taxation and the mobility of capital, analyzing how tax policies influence global capital flows. It delves into the role of tax havens in facilitating capital movement and explores common strategies used by MNCs and high-net-worth individuals to reduce their tax liabilities. Furthermore, the paper highlights global initiatives, particularly the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project, which seeks to address the challenges posed by capital mobility and tax avoidance. The study concludes by offering policy recommendations for governments to strike a balance between fostering an environment conducive to capital mobility and ensuring the sustainability of their tax systems, while preventing the erosion of their tax base in an increasingly interconnected global market.
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